

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

5 April 1949

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 142

SUBJECT: Probable Enemies, Allies, and Neutrals in the Event of War before 1953

1. Any general war before 1953 would result from Soviet aggression. It is assumed that the USSR would immediately launch major offensive operations in Europe and the Near East.

2. The following tabulations are concerned only with initial political alignments, without reference to subsequent political and military developments.

SUMMARY STATEMENT

3. Probable enemies: the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Outer Mongolia, Communist China, and North Korea.

4. Marginal areas: Finland, Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia, Sinkiang, non-Communist China.

5. Allied and associated states:

- a. Participants in the Rio Treaty.
- b. Participants in the Atlantic Pact: Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Norway, Denmark,

Note: This Memorandum was prepared in consultation with designated representatives of the Department of State and the Joint Staff to meet certain specific requirements of the National Security Resources Board.

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Iceland, Portugal, and Italy (with their colonial possessions).

c. Other recipients of US military aid: Greece, Turkey, Iran, the Philippines, Korea.

d. British Dominions: South Africa, Ceylon, Australia, and New Zealand.

e. British Arab allies: Egypt, Transjordan, and Iraq

6. Other potential allies: Ireland, Spain, Liberia, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Japan.

7. Probable neutrals: Sweden, Switzerland, Israel, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Tibet, Burma, Siam.

PROBABLE ENEMIES

8. General. In any conceivable general war before 1953 our enemies would be the USSR, its satellite states, and its fifth columns throughout the non-Soviet world. The satellite states are Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Albania, Outer Mongolia, Communist China, and North Korea. In addition, Moscow-oriented insurgents control most of Indochina.

9. Communist China. In China the early establishment of a Communist-dominated national government is probable. It is problematical, however, whether the Communists will have established by 1953 secure local control throughout China. Moreover, except with respect to Manchuria, the USSR does not now control Communist China in the same sense

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that it controls the other satellites. Active Chinese participation in the war on the side of the USSR is not a foregone conclusion. Nevertheless, the presumption is that Communist China would cooperate with the USSR to any extent required.

MARGINAL AREAS (in which the situation is too precarious to admit of their being counted in this reckoning).

10. Finland. The Finnish people, on the whole, are bitterly anti-Soviet, but Finland is incapable of resisting the USSR.

11. Germany. The German people generally are strongly anti-Communist, but Soviet control of the Soviet Zone is secure for the period under consideration. During the same period Western Germany would presumably be untenable in the event of war.

12. Austria. The situation with respect to Austria is similar to that with respect to Germany.

13. Yugoslavia. The USSR will presumably attempt to liquidate the Tito regime before 1953. If Tito succeeds in retaining power, the outbreak of war would pose for him the ultimate dilemma. To survive, he must keep Soviet forces out of Yugoslavia. Active participation in the war, on either side, would bring them in. Neutrality would result in isolation, merely postponing the day of reckoning. Among these hard choices, indecision and inertia would be on the side of neutrality, but the event is unpredictable.

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14. Sinkiang. The USSR is capable of taking control of this area at any convenient time.

15. Non-Communist China. With the possible exception of Taiwan (Formosa), any areas of China which may remain outside of the control of a Communist-dominated national government are likely to be inaccessible and inconsequential, their de facto independence extremely precarious.

ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED STATES

16. Latin America. Within the framework of the Rio Treaty, the Latin American states would support the United States, in various degrees of actual cooperation.

17. The Atlantic Pact. It is to be presumed that the participants in the Atlantic Pact -- prospectively, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, and Italy -- would loyally fulfill their obligations in the event of war.

The control exercised by certain of these powers in their respective colonial territories is reasonably secure except in two instances: Indochina and Indonesia. In Indochina French authority is restricted to the principal cities and their environs. The future of the Dutch position in Indonesia is highly problematical.

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18. Other recipients of US military aid. The military aid rendered and to be rendered to Greece, Turkey, Iran, the Philippines, and Korea presupposes their alignment with the United States in the event of war, if not their active participation in hostilities. Actually, all except the Philippines would probably be attacked by the USSR at the outset.

19. The Dominions. South Africa, Ceylon, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as Canada, may be expected to render active support to the United Kingdom in the event of war. (India and Pakistan cannot be expected to do so immediately.)

20. British Arab allies. The British treaties of alliance with Egypt, Transjordan, and Iraq would be operative in the assumed circumstances. Egypt and Iraq have shown, in the past, a disposition to repudiate this alliance, but their present tendency is toward closer relations with Great Britain. In any case, the British would utilize their bases and forces actually in these countries as the occasion required.

OTHER POTENTIAL ALLIES

21. Ireland. The Irish would at least support the West by measures short of war, and might well be persuaded to become co-belligerent.

22. Spain. Having no hope of accommodation with the USSR, Spain would seize the occasion to escape from isolation into active alliance with the Atlantic Powers.

23. Liberia and Ethiopia. These states could be persuaded to cooperate with the West to any extent required.

24. Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saud would expect the United States to defend Dhahran, and would do what he could to cooperate.

25. Syria and Lebanon. These states could not resist effectively either the USSR or the West. The initial positions of neighboring states would probably draw them into at least passive alignment with the West.

26. Japan. The Japanese would actively support US defense of Japan, not only by reason of traditional Russophobia and anti-Communism, but also in hope of rehabilitation as the premier military power in East Asia.

PROBABLE NEUTRALS

27. Sweden and Switzerland. These countries would cling to a policy called neutrality, but actually directed toward avoidance of Soviet attack on any terms short of national surrender. If attacked, however, they would resist to their utmost ability.

28. Israel. Israel's position is one of deliberate neutrality between the East and West. Western ties are actually predominant, however,

and, if compelled to take sides, Israel would probably align itself with the West.

29. Afghanistan. Favorably disposed toward the West, but in dangerous proximity to the USSR and remote from succor, Afghanistan would remain neutral unless attacked.

30. Pakistan. Pakistan would be disposed to cooperate with the West, but anxious to avoid provoking the USSR. Unless assured of immediate support on a decisive scale, it would maintain a formal neutrality.

31. India. Hoping to avoid war losses and to emerge at the close of hostilities in a stronger political and economic position in relation to the combatants, India would remain neutral.

32. Burma. This country, torn by internal dissension, would be incapable of taking effective part on either side. Even if the Communists were to gain the ascendancy, they would be too remote from Soviet support to risk provoking Western intervention.

33. Siam. Siam would have no motive to depart from benevolent neutrality unless provoked by Communists in adjacent territories or offered an opportunity for territorial expansion.

34. Yemen and Tibet. These areas are too primitive and remote to react immediately to the outbreak of hostilities.